I. Introduction
Canada accounts for a material share of global Bitcoin mining activity. The Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance estimated Canada’s contribution at roughly 6 to 10 percent of global network hashrate in recent years, though precise shares fluctuate with mining pool reporting and seasonal hydroelectric availability [1]. Between 2021 and 2022, Canadian mining operations consumed several terawatt-hours of electricity per year, placing Canada approximately sixth globally in mining-related energy usage [2].
Canada’s electricity generation mix provides a structural advantage. Approximately 60 percent of the electricity consumed by Bitcoin mining in Canada derives from hydroelectric sources [2]. As a result, mining-related CO2 emissions from Canadian operations remain proportionally lower than in fossil-dependent jurisdictions. Bitcoin mining accounts for roughly 0.1 percent of Canada’s total greenhouse gas emissions.
These national averages, however, obscure the provincial variation that defines Canadian energy policy. The same 100 MW mining load produces radically different climate, grid, and economic outcomes depending on whether it connects in Quebec, British Columbia, Alberta, or Manitoba. This divergence is the central policy problem.
The same 100 MW load. Radically different outcomes.
Province by province, the policy is the variable.
Globally, Bitcoin mining consumed an estimated 204 TWh of electricity annually by late 2025 [18], up substantially from the approximately 173 TWh estimated for 2020 to 2021 [2]. Global mining-related CO2 emissions are estimated at 86 million tonnes annually, though this figure requires updating as the global renewable share in mining has risen from approximately 20 percent in 2011 to 41 percent in 2024 [19].
The April 2024 Bitcoin halving, which reduced the block subsidy from 6.25 to 3.125 BTC, has intensified competitive pressure on miners. Operators with higher electricity costs or less efficient hardware face tighter margins, accelerating migration toward jurisdictions with cheap power and concentrating the industry among larger, better-capitalized operations. This structural shift compounds the policy stakes for Canadian provinces: the miners arriving are larger, more energy-intensive, and more strategically responsive to regulatory asymmetry than the cohort of 2020 to 2022.
II. Provincial Policy Framework Analysis
Quebec: Controlled Integration and Circular Economy Incentives
Quebec attracts cryptocurrency miners through abundant hydroelectricity and globally competitive electricity rates. By 2019, Hydro-Quebec had approved approximately 368 MW of crypto mining load and allocated an additional 300 MW block through a competitive process [3] [4]. Serious requests from miners totalled approximately 1,000 MW, far exceeding available allocation [7].
Quebec’s regulatory architecture has three structural features:
First, a competitive allocation process requiring mining companies to bid for electricity access. Proposals are evaluated on local economic benefits, job creation, and energy reuse potential. Waste heat recovery received a 10 percent weighting in project assessments, explicitly incentivizing circular economy practices [4].
Second, interruptible power contracts requiring miners to reduce consumption during peak winter demand. This limits electricity use by miners for up to 300 peak-demand hours per year [5], preserving grid stability for residential and industrial customers.
Third, a dedicated mining tariff ("Tarif CB") at approximately CAD 0.1745 per kWh (subject to periodic adjustment; a 3.6 percent increase applied to most business rates effective April 1, 2025) [20] [6]. This tariff significantly exceeds standard industrial rates, ensuring miners cover grid infrastructure costs and discouraging speculative operations.
These combined measures successfully prevented uncontrolled expansion. However, Quebec’s strict approach also deterred investment: initial allocation filled only one-fifth of the newly reserved 300 MW block [7]. Many miners established operations in provinces with less restrictive conditions.
Assessment. Quebec’s framework is the most institutionally coherent among Canadian provinces. Its weakness is not strictness per se but static calibration: evaluation weights and tariff levels set at inception have not been systematically updated against measured outcomes. A dynamic recalibration mechanism, periodically adjusting scoring weights based on observed curtailment compliance, delivered heat volumes, and local economic contribution, would improve long-term effectiveness without sacrificing control.
British Columbia: From Moratorium to Effective Ban
British Columbia offers desirable mining conditions: renewable sources generate over 98 percent of the province’s electricity [8]. By late 2022, BC Hydro had received 21 project proposals totalling approximately 1,403 MW of additional mining load, equivalent to the annual generation of two large hydroelectric dams (about 11.7 TWh annually) [8].
The provincial government imposed an 18-month moratorium on new mining connections in December 2022, suspending all pending proposals to prioritize electricity availability for transportation electrification, industrial decarbonization, and residential heating [8].
During the moratorium, British Columbia passed Bill 24 (Energy Statutes Amendment Act, 2024), granting authority to restrict, regulate, or conditionally approve future electricity connections specifically for crypto mining [9]. The legislation enables regulations that can prohibit utilities from supplying electricity to miners for specified or indefinite periods, set capacity limits, and establish conditions for service provision.
Critical update. By October 2025, BC moved toward an effective ban on cryptocurrency mining, proposing new industrial electricity rules that prioritize resource development, AI, and data centres over mining operations. The BC Utilities Commission issued a Final Order suspending BC Hydro’s obligation to supply service to cryptocurrency mining projects. This represents a significant escalation from conditional regulation to near-prohibition.
British Columbia’s single operational demonstration of circular potential remains the MintGreen project in North Vancouver. MintGreen’s proprietary "Digital Boilers" use immersion technology to recover more than 96 percent of the electricity consumed by mining as usable heat, delivered through Lonsdale Energy Corporation’s district heating system to approximately 100 residential and commercial buildings [10] [21]. The project offsets roughly 20,000 tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions per megawatt compared to natural gas heating. As of April 2024, the project remained operational.
Assessment. BC’s trajectory illustrates the political economy of mining regulation. When the planning system cannot absorb demand at the scale proposed, and when the perceived employment-to-energy ratio is unfavourable, the policy response escalates from conditional management to exclusion. The MintGreen project demonstrates that mining can deliver genuine circular value, but a single pilot was insufficient to change the province’s trajectory.
Alberta: Market Flexibility with Structural Carbon Exposure
Alberta operates a permissive, market-oriented approach. Its deregulated electricity market imposes few restrictions on mining operations. Miners contract power through private agreements or develop their own generation sources. Cheap natural gas, abundant fossil fuels, and readily available flared gas from oil production attract mining investment [11].
Alberta’s market structure incentivizes voluntary curtailment when electricity prices rise, providing short-term grid flexibility without formal mandate [1] [14]. However, voluntary behavior is not equivalent to dispatchable contracted demand response; miners face no mandated requirements for load curtailment or responsible grid behaviour.
The primary challenge is carbon intensity. Alberta’s electricity sector has undergone significant change: emissions decreased 60 percent from 2005 to 2023, with a 53.6 percent decline between 2015 and 2023 alone. The province completed its coal-to-gas transition in June 2024, and renewable energy (wind, solar, hydro) contributed approximately 19 percent of total generation in 2024, up from 17 percent in 2023 [12].
Despite this progress, Alberta’s grid remains substantially more carbon-intensive than Quebec’s or BC’s hydro-dominant systems. A typical 1 MW mining facility in Alberta generates approximately 5,300 tonnes of CO2 annually [12]. This figure should be treated as approximate and declining with Alberta’s ongoing grid transition, but it remains an order of magnitude higher than equivalent operations on hydro-dominant grids.
Alberta’s renewable energy moratorium (August 2023 to February 2024) created additional uncertainty. While the moratorium technically lifted, the provincial government imposed significant new restrictions on renewable development: bans on renewable projects on high-quality agricultural land, 35-kilometre viewscape buffer zones around "pristine view" designations, and an overarching "agriculture first" policy [13]. These conditions were characterized as a moratorium "shifted, not lifted" [22].
Assessment. Alberta demonstrates that market-driven flexibility can support grid reliability but does not, on its own, address climate alignment. Without binding carbon-intensity standards or renewable procurement requirements, Alberta’s competitive advantage in attracting miners functions as an emissions subsidy. Off-grid flare-gas operations offer real methane abatement value, but claims must be verified against measured abatement outcomes, not promotional narratives.
Manitoba: Extended Moratorium
Manitoba’s abundant hydroelectric resources attracted extraordinary interest. By late 2022, Manitoba Hydro received mining proposals totalling approximately 4,600 MW, representing roughly 75 percent of Manitoba’s total generation capacity of approximately 6,100 MW [6].
The province imposed an 18-month moratorium on new crypto-mining connections in November 2022 [23]. In April 2024, Manitoba directed Manitoba Hydro to extend the pause until April 30, 2026, to allow further analysis [24]. The moratorium does not affect 37 existing cryptocurrency operations already connected.
Assessment. Manitoba’s moratorium was proportionate to the scale of proposed demand relative to system capacity. The ongoing policy gap is the absence of a post-moratorium framework. Without defined criteria for selective reintegration, the moratorium risks becoming a de facto ban without the institutional clarity that explicit prohibition or conditional approval would provide.
III. International Policy Transferability
Texas: Flexible Loads Through Real-Time Pricing
Texas has established itself as a leading mining jurisdiction by leveraging its deregulated ERCOT market. Miners respond to real-time electricity pricing, reducing loads during peak conditions and earning compensation through ancillary services and energy resale. Riot Platforms received $31.7 million in combined power and demand response credits in a single month (August 2023), including $7 million from ERCOT’s ancillary services program and $24 million from selling pre-purchased energy to TXU Energy [25]. The company curtailed power usage by over 95 percent during peak demand periods.
Transferability. Canadian provinces with wholesale electricity markets (Alberta, Ontario) could formally integrate mining loads into existing demand-response or capacity markets. Provinces with regulated utilities (BC, Manitoba) might instead structure interruptible tariffs. The key lesson is not institutional replication but mechanism transfer: price-exposed or contract-bound flexibility as a planning instrument.
European Union: Efficiency Standards and Heat Recovery Mandates
Under the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED), the EU mandates detailed reporting of Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE) and encourages waste heat recovery for large data centres [15]. Some EU jurisdictions require new data centres to connect directly to district heating systems or demonstrate feasible heat recovery [16]. The EU also explores sustainability labels for mining facilities meeting environmental benchmarks.
Transferability. Provincial regulators or Natural Resources Canada could set minimum PUE thresholds and mandatory feasibility studies for waste heat reuse above a defined capacity. A "green mining" certification system would provide market differentiation for compliant operators.
China: Restriction and Displacement Logic
China dominated global Bitcoin mining before implementing a complete ban in 2021. The ban succeeded in eliminating domestic mining but displaced activity to jurisdictions with less regulated grids, producing uncertain net global emissions effects [17].
Transferability. Hard prohibition can reduce domestic exposure but redistribute rather than eliminate emissions. The relevant policy instrument is conditional access rather than blanket prohibition. Carbon-intensity-based approval thresholds, where provinces restrict or disincentivize facilities on high-emission grids unless operators secure verified renewable procurement or carbon offsets, offer better net outcomes.
IV. Metrics and Quantification for Energy Circularity
The metrics framework defined in Appendix B (Table B.1) provides the quantitative basis for comparing two policy scenarios for Bitcoin mining expansion in Canada. Note that hardware efficiency benchmarks from the original April 2025 analysis require updating: the Antminer S21 Pro now delivers 15 J/TH, the network-wide average has reached approximately 15.2 J/TH as of January 2026 [26], and the Antminer S23 Hyd achieves 9.5 J/TH [27]. The original paper’s assumption of "25 J/TH for latest ASICs" reflects a generation of hardware that is now mid-tier, and its Scenario B target of "15 J/TH" is already the global average rather than an aspirational benchmark. The scenario tables below are corrected accordingly.
Scenario A: Business-as-Usual
Minimal new policy intervention. Provinces with existing restrictions or moratoria (BC, Manitoba) maintain them. New mining activity concentrates in provinces with fewer regulations, primarily Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Atlantic Canada. Total national mining capacity increases to approximately 1,000 MW, reflecting global growth trends moderated by high provincial electricity costs and post-halving competitive pressure. Key outcomes:
-
Renewable energy share decreases from current levels near 75 percent to approximately 40 percent as Alberta’s fossil-dependent grid absorbs most new capacity.
-
Annual carbon emissions rise to roughly 3.5 Mt CO2 per year. Alberta alone contributes nearly 2.8 Mt CO2 annually.
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Heat recovery remains minimal (under 10 percent nationally). Operations in fossil-dependent regions often occur in remote areas without nearby users for waste heat.
-
Demand-response capability remains modest: approximately 150 MW (15 percent of total load), dependent solely on voluntary market behaviour.
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Facility-level efficiency averages approximately 1.10 PUE. Average hardware efficiency settles around 17 J/TH as post-halving competition forces mid-tier hardware retirement but does not mandate frontier adoption.
-
Employment remains low: 1 to 2 direct jobs per 10 MW installed.
-
Grid impacts are neutral to negative. Continuous load in fossil-heavy grids can elevate local electricity prices.
Scenario B: Circular Economy Policy Integration
Coordinated policy interventions distribute 1,000 MW of mining load across provinces under enforceable renewable energy, heat recovery, emissions, and demand-response requirements:
-
British Columbia: permits 200 MW under mandatory heat-utilization agreements tied to district heating or industrial heat users. (This allocation requires a reversal of BC’s current trajectory toward prohibition, conditioned on demonstrated circular value.)
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Quebec: authorizes 300 MW contingent on minimum heat-recovery requirements and peak-hour curtailment capability.
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Manitoba: approves 100 MW linked to surplus wind generation and agricultural heat applications.
-
Alberta: allows 300 MW, split between grid-connected facilities subject to carbon-offset requirements and off-grid operations utilizing verified flare-gas abatement.
-
Ontario and other provinces: combined 100 MW pilot program for grid-balancing services.
Quantitative outcomes:
-
Renewable energy share reaches approximately 85 percent as hydro, wind, solar, and nuclear baseload dominate the supply mix.
-
Carbon emissions decrease to approximately 0.5 Mt CO2 per year. Off-grid flare-gas operations in Alberta further reduce net emissions through verified methane abatement.
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Heat recovery reaches 30 to 40 percent nationally. Approximately 350 MW of continuous heat (roughly 3 million MWh annually) becomes usable energy, offsetting fossil-fuel heating equivalent to approximately 550,000 tonnes of CO2 per year.
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Demand-response capability expands to approximately 600 MW (60 percent of total load), providing peak-load reduction and intermittent renewable energy balancing.
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Facility efficiency improves to approximately 1.05 PUE. Average hardware efficiency reaches approximately 12 J/TH as frontier hardware (S23 Hyd class at 9.5 J/TH) enters the fleet alongside current-generation equipment.
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Employment per MW installed increases two to three times through integration with district heating, agricultural, and industrial heat consumers.
-
Grid impacts become positive: mining facilities absorb excess renewable generation and reduce peak demands.
The comparative outcomes are summarized in Appendix B, Table B.2.
V. Policy Recommendations
Recommendation 1: Mandatory Demand Response Integration
Provinces should mandate demand-response participation for all mining facilities above 5 MW. Utilities must establish interruptible tariffs providing reduced off-peak rates in exchange for curtailment during peak demand or emergencies. Facilities must install smart metering enabling utility-verifiable load control. Provincial utility commissions would oversee tariffs to prevent cross-subsidization. Interprovincial standards should be coordinated through the Canadian Council of Energy Ministers to prevent regulatory arbitrage.
Recommendation 2: Mandatory Waste Heat Recovery
Provinces must require waste heat recovery for mining facilities exceeding 1 MW. Operators would submit standardized Heat Reuse Feasibility Studies during the project approval process, detailing potential local heat users: district heating systems, agricultural operations, or industrial processes. Where feasible pathways exist, implementation becomes a condition of interconnection. Facilities failing to implement feasible heat reuse face financial penalties or higher tariffs. Municipal zoning should encourage co-location of mining with district heating infrastructure.
Recommendation 3: Renewable Energy Matching and Carbon Intensity Standards
Provinces must implement either renewable energy procurement obligations or carbon-intensity ceilings for mining operations. Options include Renewable Portfolio Standards mandating progressive procurement increases, reaching full renewable sourcing by 2030; or maximum carbon-intensity benchmarks requiring miners on high-emission grids to offset emissions exceeding defined thresholds through verified procurement or offsets. Annual third-party audits ensure compliance. National harmonization prevents jurisdiction-shopping.
Recommendation 4: Public Transparency and Reporting
Standardized disclosure tables should be published across provinces, covering curtailment performance, energy mix, heat delivery volumes, and emissions factors by site class. Public reporting demonstrates community value and enables interprovincial performance comparison.
VI. Unintended Consequences and Mitigation
Integrating Bitcoin mining into Canada’s circular economy carries risks that require explicit management:
a. Emissions leakage. Overly restrictive local regulations may shift mining to fossil-dependent jurisdictions, increasing net global emissions. Coordinated interprovincial standards and economic incentives for renewable-powered mining mitigate this risk.
b. Market distortion. Excessively low electricity tariffs for miners could transfer costs to other ratepayers. Transparent pricing that fully reflects energy and infrastructure costs prevents cross-subsidization. Competitive bidding processes, similar to Quebec’s allocation approach, ensure fair cost distribution.
c. Competition for grid capacity. Mining load growth now competes directly with AI and data-centre demand for the same provincial grid capacity. Explicit integration of projected mining loads into provincial resource and infrastructure planning, alongside competing high-density demands, prevents uncoordinated allocation.
d. Regulatory arbitrage. Operators may fragment operations or deploy behind-the-meter installations to evade regulatory thresholds. Lower trigger thresholds, consistent inter-provincial application, and systematic utility monitoring of unexpected load growth address this risk.
e. Electronic waste. ASIC replacement cycles are accelerating post-halving as tighter margins force rapid hardware turnover. Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) programs, formal inclusion of mining hardware in provincial e-waste recycling frameworks, and resale or repurposing incentives are necessary.
f. Community and social impacts. Noise, siting conflict, and perceived resource competition can undermine local acceptance. Proactive community engagement, benefit-sharing agreements, strict noise enforcement, and appropriate zoning standards are essential.
g. Stranded asset risk. The April 2024 halving and continued difficulty increases accelerate hardware obsolescence. Miners operating on thin margins face stranded capital, potentially abandoning sites with unresolved environmental obligations. Interconnection agreements should require performance bonds or site remediation guarantees.
VII. Conclusion
The provincial divergence in Canadian electricity systems means that no single national policy posture toward Bitcoin mining is coherent. What matters is the conditional architecture: the specific instruments that transform an undifferentiated energy load into a managed, measurable, and accountable grid participant.
Quebec’s framework demonstrates that institutional control over capacity allocation, pricing, and interruptibility can prevent disorderly expansion while preserving circular economy potential. British Columbia’s trajectory from moratorium to effective prohibition illustrates the political cost when planning systems cannot absorb demand at scale. Alberta’s market flexibility produces grid reliability benefits but requires binding environmental constraints to prevent functioning as an emissions subsidy. Manitoba’s extended moratorium is proportionate to system-scale risk but needs a defined post-moratorium framework to avoid becoming permanent exclusion by default.
The circular economy pathway is available. The MintGreen project proves that 96 percent heat recovery is technically achievable. Texas demonstrates that demand-response integration can generate tens of millions of dollars in grid-stabilization value per facility. Hardware efficiency has advanced from 25 J/TH to below 10 J/TH in two generations, compressing the energy cost per unit of computation.
What remains absent is the institutional architecture to make these outcomes systematic rather than anecdotal. Mandatory interruptibility, audited heat recovery, binding carbon-intensity standards, and public transparency are the minimum conditions under which Bitcoin mining can credibly claim a place in Canada’s circular energy economy. Without them, mining operates as opportunistic demand that follows regulatory gaps. With them, it becomes a flexible, measurable, and accountable participant in provincial grid management.
References27View cited sources
[1] Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, "Bitcoin mining: an (un)surprising resurgence?," Cambridge Judge Business School, May 17, 2022. Available online.
[2] S. Chamanara, S. A. Ghaffarizadeh, and K. Madani, "The environmental footprint of Bitcoin mining across the globe: call for urgent action," Earth’s Future, vol. 11, no. 10, Art. no. e2023EF003871, Oct. 2023. DOI: 10.1029/2023EF003871.
[3] B. Brown, "Crypto-friendly Quebec discounts electricity, luring Bitcoin miners into Canada," CCN, Mar. 4, 2021. Available online.
[4] Hydro-Quebec, "Hydro-Quebec launches a request for proposals regarding the allocation of a 300 MW block of capacity," Press Release, Jun. 5, 2019. Available online.
[5] K. Dangerfield, "Bitcoin’s fossil fuel use criticized. But some Canadian companies hope to turn it green," Global News, May 13, 2021. Available online.
[6] Hydro-Quebec, "Quebec’s blockchain industry," updated Jan. 10, 2023. Available online.
[7] J. Martin, "Has Quebec missed the ship for attracting cryptocurrency miners?," Cointelegraph, Jan. 23, 2020. Available online.
[8] Government of British Columbia, "New legislation ensures B.C. benefits from clean, affordable electricity," News Release, Apr. 11, 2024. Available online.
[9] K. J. Howard, D. Nikolejsin, V. Lucas, R. Carlson, and K. E. Griffin, "Amping up the rules: BC to regulate crypto-mining electricity use," McCarthy Tetrault LLP, May 17, 2024. Available online.
[10] District Energy, "This Canadian city will be heated by Bitcoin mining," Mar. 10, 2022. Available online.
[11] S. Kennedy, "Canadian oil producer mines bitcoin, snuffs out gas flare," Energy Flux, May 9, 2021. Available online.
[12] Canada Energy Regulator, "Provincial and territorial energy profiles: Alberta," Government of Canada, 2023. Available online.
[13] J. Wang and W. Noel, "Investment impact of Alberta’s renewable energy moratorium," Pembina Institute, Aug. 24, 2023. Available online.
[14] A. Ashraf, "Riot Blockchain mined 28% less Bitcoin in July as heat wave cut power supply," CoinDesk, Aug. 3, 2022. Available online.
[15] European Commission, "Commission adopts EU-wide scheme for rating sustainability of data centres," Mar. 15, 2024. Available online.
[16] D. Barcaba and E. Kaufman, "Impact of the Energy Efficiency Directive and the Energy Efficiency Act on companies, especially data centre operators," Bird and Bird LLP, Dec. 16, 2024. Available online.
[17] N. Smith, "Countries say no to energy guzzling Bitcoin mines," Greenpeace USA, May 14, 2024. Available online.
[18] CoinLaw, "Bitcoin energy consumption statistics 2026," 2026. Available online.
[19] MiCA x Nodiens, "The carbon footprint path to 2030," 2025. Available online.
[20] Hydro-Quebec, "Rate CB: Blockchains," 2025. Available online.
[21] District Energy, "How a startup is supplying a whole city with heat from Bitcoin mining," Apr. 16, 2024. Available online.
[22] Environmental Law Centre (Alberta), "Renewables moratorium shifted not lifted," 2024. Available online.
[23] Manitoba Hydro, "Province directs Manitoba Hydro to pause new cryptocurrency connections," Nov. 2022. Available online.
[24] Manitoba Hydro, "Province directs Manitoba Hydro to continue pause on new cryptocurrency connections," Apr. 2024. Available online.
[25] Houston Chronicle, "One bitcoin company received millions to reduce electricity use," Sept. 2023. Available online.
[26] Bitcoin Power Consumption, "Bitcoin average joules per terahash," 2026. Available online.
[27] ASIC Miner Value, "SHA-256 miners efficiency," 2026. Available online.
Appendix A: Terms and Definitions
ASIC (Application-Specific Integrated Circuit): Specialized hardware designed specifically for cryptocurrency mining, offering high computational efficiency relative to general-purpose hardware. Current frontier: Antminer S23 Hyd at 9.5 J/TH.
Carbon intensity: CO2 emissions produced per unit of electricity consumed, typically expressed as kg CO2 per MWh. Alberta’s grid intensity has declined substantially with coal-to-gas transition (completed June 2024) but remains far above hydro-dominant provinces.
Carbon offset: Verified emissions reductions achieved through renewable energy investment, methane capture, reforestation, or other removal and abatement pathways.
Circular economy: An economic design model focused on resource reuse, waste minimization, and lifecycle efficiency. In the mining context, the primary instruments are waste heat recovery and demand-response grid integration.
Community benefit funds: Financial mechanisms directing a portion of mining revenue into local infrastructure, economic development, or environmental enhancement.
Demand response (DR): Load adjustment in response to grid stress, pricing signals, or emergency events. Distinct from voluntary curtailment: contracted DR is dispatchable and verifiable; voluntary curtailment is not.
Electronic waste (e-waste): End-of-life electrical and electronic equipment, including retired ASIC mining hardware. ASIC replacement cycles are accelerating post-halving.
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR): Policy model requiring producers to manage end-of-life environmental impacts through recycling, recovery, or responsible disposal.
Hashrate: Total computational mining power, typically expressed in TH/s, PH/s, or EH/s. Higher hashrate indicates greater computational and energy expenditure.
Hashing: The computational process of transforming input data into a fixed-length output, used in mining to validate transactions and maintain blockchain consensus.
Interruptible power contracts: Utility agreements permitting curtailment during peak conditions in exchange for preferential pricing. Distinct from voluntary market-driven curtailment.
Methane flare-gas utilization: Use of otherwise flared or vented methane from oil and gas production for electricity generation, including mobile mining contexts. Claims require verified measurement of actual methane abatement.
Moratorium: A temporary administrative suspension on new project approvals or electricity interconnections.
Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE): Total facility power divided by IT equipment power. Lower values indicate better infrastructure efficiency. Industry benchmark for optimized facilities: 1.05 or below.
Regulatory arbitrage: Exploiting rule differences across jurisdictions to reduce compliance burden. Particularly relevant in Canadian federation where provinces set divergent electricity and environmental standards.
Renewable energy share: Percentage of total electricity consumption sourced from renewable generation (hydro, wind, solar, biomass).
Terahash (TH): One trillion hashing operations per second.
Waste heat recovery: Capture and beneficial reuse of thermal output from mining operations, typically for district heating, agricultural, or industrial applications.
Appendix B: Metrics and Scenario Tables
Table B.1: Key Metrics for Bitcoin Mining Energy Analysis
| Metric | Definition / Formula | Significance and Targets |
|---|---|---|
Joules per Terahash (J/TH) |
Device power (W) divided by hashrate (TH/s) |
Hardware efficiency. Current frontier: 9.5 J/TH (S23 Hyd). Network average: ~15.2 J/TH (Jan 2026). Mid-tier: 17 to 25 J/TH. Obsolete: 30+ J/TH. |
Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE) |
Total facility power divided by IT equipment power |
Infrastructure efficiency. Typical: ~1.10. Target: 1.05 or below. Heat-reuse-integrated facilities can approach 1.02. |
Renewable Energy Share (%) |
Renewable MWh divided by total MWh, multiplied by 100 |
Sourcing sustainability. BC: ~98%. QC: ~95%. AB: ~19% (2024). Global mining average: ~41% (2024). |
Carbon Intensity |
kg CO2 per MWh, derived from provincial grid emission factor |
Climate impact. BC hydro: near zero. QC hydro: near zero. AB grid: declining but substantially higher. Target: province-specific thresholds with offset obligations. |
Heat Recovery Rate (%) |
Recovered heat divided by total waste heat, multiplied by 100 |
Circularity performance. Achievable with immersion/district heating: up to 96% (MintGreen). Typical without recovery: 0%. Target for large facilities: 30% or above. |
Demand Response Capacity |
MW curtailable plus annual event hours utilized |
Grid support. Riot Platforms demonstrated 95%+ curtailment in peak events, earning $31.7M in a single month (Aug 2023). |
CO2 Offset via Heat/DR |
Tonnes CO2 avoided annually through heat reuse or DR curtailment |
Net environmental benefit. 1 MW with 80% heat reuse offsets approximately 1,260 tCO2/year. |
Jobs per MW |
Direct employment per MW of installed mining load |
Socio-economic value. Mining alone: 1 to 3 jobs/MW. With heat-utilization integration: higher through recipient industries. |
Table B.2: Comparative Scenario Outcomes
| Metric | Scenario A: Business-as-Usual | Scenario B: Circular Policy Integration |
|---|---|---|
Total mining load |
1,000 MW concentrated regionally |
1,000 MW distributed nationally |
Renewable energy share |
~40% (fossil-heavy grid absorption) |
~85% (renewable and low-carbon supply) |
Annual CO2 emissions |
~3.5 Mt CO2 |
~0.5 Mt CO2 |
Waste heat utilization |
Under 10% |
30 to 40% |
CO2 offset from heat reuse |
~0.1 Mt CO2 annually |
~0.55 Mt CO2 annually |
Net CO2 impact |
+3.4 Mt net emissions |
Near-zero (approximately -0.05 Mt net) |
Average PUE |
1.10 |
1.05 |
Hardware efficiency (J/TH) |
~17 J/TH (mid-tier fleet post-halving) |
~12 J/TH (frontier-weighted fleet) |
Demand-response flexibility |
~150 MW (voluntary only) |
~600 MW (contracted and dispatchable) |
Grid impact |
Neutral to negative |
Positive stabilization |
Economic co-benefits |
Low multiplier (1 to 2 jobs/10 MW) |
Higher local value through heat integration |
Policy goals alignment |
Fails climate targets; minimal circularity |
Aligns with circular economy framework |